






































































UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 






ASSURANCE IQ, LLC, et al., 
Defendants. 
 
Case No. 4:20-cv-02860-JSW    
 
 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
DISMISS  
 
Re: Dkt. No. 28 
 
 
Now before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended complaint.  (Dkt. 
No. 28 (“MTD”).)  The Court has considered the parties’ papers, relevant legal authority, and the 
record in this case, and it finds the motion suitable for disposition without oral argument.  See 
N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b).  The Court GRANTS defendants’ motions to dismiss. 
BACKGROUND 
 Plaintiff Florentino Javier (“Javier”) brings this purported consumer privacy class action 
against defendants Assurance IQ, LLC (“Assurance”) and ActiveProspect Inc. (“ActiveProspect”) 
(together, “Defendants”) for violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), Cal. 
Penal Code § 631, and the California Constitution based on surreptitious recording of user actions 
on Assurance’s website.  The complaint alleges as follows.  (Dkt. No. 24 (“FAC”).) 
 Assurance is an online platform for life insurance quotes.  (Id. ¶ 6.)  Assurance runs a 
website called Nationalfamily.com that allows persons to obtain life insurance quotes.  (Id. ¶ 9, 
40.)  A user enters information about her demographics, family situation, and medical history, and 
then clicks “View My Quote.”  (Id. ¶¶ 33-39.)  At the final step, the website states that by clicking 
“View my Quote,” the user provides an  “electronic signature as an indication of . . . intent to 
agree to the website’s Privacy Policy” and “Terms of Service.”  (Id. ¶ 39.)  This is shown below: 


















































































Assurance partners with ActiveProspect for its website.  (Id. ¶¶ 23-26.)  ActiveProspect 
provides “TrustedForm,” which is a “lead certification product that helps businesses comply with 
regulations like the Telephone Consumer Protection Act . . . by documenting consumer consent.”  
(Id. ¶ 12 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).)  Specifically, TrustedForm is a piece of 
javascript code that can be pasted into a form page to record “keystrokes, mouse clicks, data entry, 
and other electronic communications of visitors to websites.”  (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.)  As the result, a 
website owner can record a video of a users’ interaction on its website, including consent to being 
contacted by phone.  (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) 
Javier visited Assurance’s website on January 2019.  (Id. ¶ 30.)  He entered all of the 
required information, including health data, and presumably obtained a life insurance quote.  (Id. 
¶¶ 33-39.)  A few months later, Javier sent a letter through counsel to an unnamed company “over 
purported violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.”  (Id. ¶ 46.)  The company then 
produced a recording of him consenting to being contacted by phone.  (Id.)  Javier was “shocked 
to discover” that his activities had been recorded on Assurance’s website, and brought this lawsuit 
the same month.  (Id. ¶ 47.)  






































































A. Legal Standard. 
Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is granted when the pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted.  Pursuant to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state 
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  “A claim has facial 
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).  If the allegations are insufficient to state a claim, a 
court should grant leave to amend, unless amendment would be futile.  See Reddy v. Litton Indus., 
Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990).  Where a plaintiff alleges fraud, Rule 9(b) requires the 
plaintiff to state the circumstances constituting fraud with particularity.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).  
Particularity under Rule 9(b) requires the plaintiff to plead the “who, what, when, where, and 
how” of the misconduct.  See Kearns v. v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009).   
B. The Court Grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 
Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that Javier consented to having his information 
collected on Assurance’s website.  Consent generally defeats privacy claims.  That is because a 
party that consents to having information collected has no reasonable expectation of privacy.  See 
Opperman v. Path, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2016).  CIPA expressly requires 
“unauthorized” conduct or conduct “without the consent of all parties.”  Cal. Penal Code § 631.  
The California Constitution similarly requires that “the plaintiff’s expectations of privacy . . . be 
reasonable.”  Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 47 Cal. 4th 272, 287 (2009); see also Hill v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal. 4th 1, 26 (1994) (no “egregious” intrusion with consent).  
That said, consent “is not an all-or-nothing proposition.”  In re Google, No. 13-MD-02430-
LHK, 2013 WL 5423918, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013).  “There are degrees and nuances to 
societal recognition of our expectations of privacy:  the fact that the privacy one expects in a given 
setting is not complete or absolute does not render the expectation unreasonable as a matter of 
law.”  Sanders. v. Am. Bd. Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 907, 916 (1999).  Consent is therefore generally 





































































limited to the specific conduct authorized.  See, e.g., Campbell v. Facebook Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 
836, 847 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (no consent to data being used for targeted advertising where users 
consented to its use for “data analysis”); In re Google Assistant Privacy Litig., 457 F. Supp. 3d 
797, 824 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (consent to data collection does not extend to data disclosure).  Consent 
is frequently evaluated using principles of contract to determine “whether the user ‘agreed’” to the  
specific use or collection.  In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig., 402 F. 
Supp. 3d 767, 789 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
Here, the parties do not dispute that Javier affirmatively clicked on “View My Quote” on 
Assurance’s website to indicate “intent to agree to th[e] website’s Privacy Policy.”  (FAC ¶ 39.)  
The privacy policy, which is subject to judicial notice,1 states: 
We collect the content and other personal information that may be 
used to identify you as an individual you provide when you use our 
Services, including when you request an insurance quote, apply for 
insurance, and sign up for an account. This can be personally 
identifiable information, health information, and information about 
property you own or lease. We also collect information about how 
you use our Services, such as the types of content you view or engage 
with or the frequency and duration of your activities. …. 
The personal information we may collect includes, but is not limited 
to: name, address, date of birth, phone number, email address, height, 
weight, social security number, vehicle details, personal and family 
health information …. 
We may use third party vendors to assist us with the Service. Some 
examples of the assistance that may be provided by third party service 
providers are: monitoring and analyzing Site activity, operations and 
marketing, hosting the Site, and maintaining our database. …. 
By submitting your personal information either to us or to any of your 
partners, you consent to the use of your personal information as set 
forth above, and to the transfer of that data to our partners or those 
individuals or entities we engage to provide Services in connection 
with your transaction.   
 
(Dkt. No. 28-4 at 4 (“Privacy Policy”).)  
 
1 The privacy policy is properly subject to judicial notice because it is publicly available on 
Defendants’ website and Javier does not question its authenticity.  See Google Assistant Privacy 
Litig., 457 F. Supp. 3d at 814; Opperman, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 1068 n.3.  





































































Defendants argue that this Privacy Policy discloses each action that Javier now challenges 
as intrusive, including:  collection of sensitive information (“We collect  . . . health information”), 
monitoring of website activity (“We also collect information about how you use our Services, such 
as the types of content you view or engage with or the frequency and duration of your activities”), 
use of ActiveProspect (“We may use third party vendors to assist us with the Service,” including 
“monitoring and analyzing Site activity”), and data sharing with ActiveProspect (“[Y]ou consent 
to . . . the transfer of that data to . . . entities we engage to provide Services”).  However, Javier 
argues that his consent was invalid because (1) it occurred after the alleged privacy invasion took 
place, (2) Javier lacked sufficient notice of the privacy policy, and (3) the privacy policy did not 
disclose the exact conduct at issue. 
With respect to the first issue, the Court has found no case addressing retroactive consent 
in the privacy context.2  However, outside of privacy law, California courts frequently uphold 
retroactive consent as valid.  See, e.g., Salgado v. Carrows Rest., Inc., 33 Cal. App. 5th 356, 361 
(2019) (rejecting the claim that agreement to arbitrate “must pre-date the actions giving rise to the 
dispute” as “contrary to contract principles”); Franco v. Greystone Ridge Condominium, 39 Cal. 
App. 5th 221, 230 (2019) (similar).  These cases do not require express language specifying that 
consent extends retroactively, as long as there is no time “limitation or restriction” on the claims.  
See Franco, 39 Cal. App. 5th at 230.  The privacy policy here is phrased in present tense—“we 
collect” data when “you use our Services,” not “we will collect”—and thus gives fair notice that 
Javier consents to actions that may have already taken place.  Accordingly, on these facts, the 
Court finds Javier’s retroactive consent to data collection valid.3        
 
2 Javier cites two inapposite cases concerning the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 
which was specifically enacted to protect against the “difficulty of ‘un-disclosing’ biometric 
information,” Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 3d 604, 617 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 
2020), and confusing consent screens, where the terms and conditions appeared after the user may 
reasonably conclude to have agreed to them.  Kauders v. Uber Techs., Inc., SUCV20162180D, 
2019 WL 510568, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2019) 
 
3 That is not to say that retroactive consent will always be valid.  The data collection here occurred 
mere minutes and seconds before Javier gave consent during a single website visit.  The Court 
does not address facts not before it, such as where data was collected months or weeks before. 
 





































































With respect to the sufficiency of notice, Javier’s argument is meritless.  The agreement 
here is “clickwrap,” not “browsewrap,” which courts routinely uphold as valid.  See, e.g., Holl v. 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 16-cv-05856-HSG, 2017 WL 11520143, at **3-5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
18, 2017); In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 
2016); Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 904, 910-12 (N.D. Cal. 2011)).  Even 
though the button that Javier pressed used different verbiage—“View My Quote,” instead of “I 
agree”—the Ninth Circuit has upheld similar cases where a user affirmatively indicated assent.  
See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014).  Indeed, the agreement 
here is similar to the one in Facebook Biometric Information Privacy Litigation, where a user 
indicated assent by clicking “Register Now,” which had a hyperlink to the terms and conditions 
below.  See 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1162-63; see also Dohrmann v. Intuit, Inc., 823 F. App’x 482, 484 
(9th Cir. 2020) (upholding consent through notice below a “Sign In” button). 
Javier dissects the details of the consent page, including the use of light blue letters and 
lack of underlining, to argue that he lacked notice, but this argument largely misses the point.  The 
adequacy of notice must ultimately be evaluated holistically, not through mechanical application 
of formatting rules.4  Here, the webpage on which Javier provided consent was uncluttered, with 
only a few entry fields followed by the disclosure on a single page; the text placed hyperlinks in a 
different color to indicate their selectability; and there were no additional features, such as a dark 
background or additional links having different formatting, that would have obscured the notice.  
On similar facts, courts have frequently found notice sufficient.  See Peter v. DoorDash, Inc., 445 
F. Supp. 3d 580, 585-87 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (discussing cases).  Viewed holistically, the clean and 
uncluttered page by which Javier affirmatively consented, while having full ability and immediate 
opportunity to read the privacy policy, shows that he had sufficient notice. 
Last, with respect to the substance of the Privacy Policy’s disclosure, Javier argues that the 
policy does not disclose recording because it places some disclosures in the “Web beacons” 
section, instead of the “cookies and tracking technology” section; because the tracking technology 
 
4 In any case, as explained by Defendants, courts have found notice adequate without any of the 
features cited by Javier.  (See Dkt. No. 28 (“MTD”) at 8:22-9:24.)  





































































section indicates that tracking is performed “to enhance your shopping experience”; because the 
policy states Assurance “may” use third party monitors; and because “transfer [] of data” does 
indicate real time monitoring.  These arguments are largely irrelevant.  The policy clearly indicates 
that Assurance tracks activity on its website and may use third party vendors to do so.  The policy 
as a whole is only two pages long, which means that none of the terms are buried or obscured.  
That the privacy policy also discusses other types of tracking, such as data collection for purposes 
of personalization, does not detract from its plain disclosures elsewhere.  Accordingly, the Court 
finds that the privacy policy to which Javier agreed disclosed the specific conduct at issue here. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses Javier’s claims based on consent.5 
CONCLUSION 
  For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss.  The Court 
grants Javier leave to amend, if he can do so in good faith and in compliance with his obligations 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 having considered the conclusions reached in this Order.  
Javier shall file and serve an amended complaint or a statement that no such amended complaint 
shall be filed within twenty days of the date of this Order, and Defendants shall file their response 
within twenty days thereafter. 
 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated:  March 9, 2021  
______________________________________ 
JEFFREY S. WHITE 
United States District Judge 
 
5 Defendants also move to dismiss for failure to state a claim because Assurance was a party to the 
communications and its collection of data for the purpose of providing life insurance quotes was 
not an “egregious” violation of social norms.  Javier opposes by arguing that secret recording by a 
third-party, ActiveProspect, could satisfy these elements.  However, that is not what the complaint 
alleges.  Javier alleges that Assurance itself collects the information by pasting TrustedField 
javascript into its form page, which acts “as a hidden field.”  (FAC ¶ 20.)  Because the complaint 
never alleges that ActivePropspect itself every recorded or received his data, only that it provided 
a product by which Assurance did so, his opposition misses the mark.  The complaint is therefore 
further dismissed for failure to state a claim.   
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